How an increase in pace could unlock the Knicks’ offense
The Knicks are one of the slowest teams in the league, throwing out the “pace” of the “pace and space” era. Could a few small adjustments to their style of play lead to a more dynamic and modern offense?
The modern basketball age is defined as the “pace and space” era, but “space” seems to garner much more attention than “pace.” If you ask the average basketball fan, or even the talking heads on your TV screen, how the game has changed in the last decade, they’ll reference the rapid and exponential increase in 3-point attempts per game; i.e. the direct cause of the increased “space” of modern NBA offense. And this is, of course, an accurate observation — from the 2011-2012 season to this season, the average 3-point attempts per game has increased annually and almost doubled over that span, from 18 per game in 2012 to 35 this season.
However, that analysis ignores the “pace” element (potential correlations aside), which also represents a powerful shift in NBA gameplay over the last decade. Since the 2011-2012 season, average pace per game, — measured by the average number of possessions per 48 minutes — has also increased every year, from 91 possessions per 48 minutes in 2012 to 100 possessions last year (interestingly, pace is down slightly this year for the first time in a decade).
And then there are the 2020-2021 New York Knicks — disruptor of trends, regrettable counterculturalists. The Knicks currently rank second-to-last in 3-point attempts per game. Additionally, the Knicks currently rank dead last in pace, averaging just 95.6 possessions per game. For context, these Knicks are playing so slowly that their pace would have been dead last in each of the last two seasons as well. Instead of “pace and space,” the 2020-2021 Knicks have embraced “slog and clog.”
The “clog” element has already been discussed and written about in abundance this season. Yes, the Knicks could probably employ lineups with better spacing to increase their 3-point attempts. But, even so, this roster simply does not have the shooting capability to create loads of space. This was never going to be a high-volume 3-point shooting team, and the offensive ceiling is realistically fairly low, even if the current lineups are performing at a level too close to the team’s floor.
Far less understandable, though, is the Knicks’ refusal to play with pace. Playing with pace by maximizing transition opportunities and running the floor to create easier looks can only help an offense that was destined to struggle in the half court. The Knicks should be dynamic in transition, with several athletic players (like Julius Randle, RJ Barrett, Obi Toppin, and even Elfrid Payton) who can rebound and go, run the floor, and finish. In fact, Tom Thibodeau apparently had the same thought prior to the season, when it was reported that he was emphasizing playing fast and taking advantage of his roster’s athleticism during preseason practices.
Sadly, Thibodeau’s teams have always played at a crawl. His Chicago Bulls teams ranked in the bottom third of the league in pace in each of the five seasons he coached them. Similarly, during his two full seasons with the Minnesota Tiimberwolves — despite the roster’s relative youth and athleticism — they too played at a bottom-third pace. That said, context matters. Despite playing slow, the Wolves, equipped with one of the most versatile offensive centers in league history in Karl-Anthony Towns, actually had a top-10 offense in both full years Thibs coached them. In Chicago, while the offensive efficiency fluctuated wildly from year to year (likely dependent on the unfortunate fluctuations in health of their best player, Derrick Rose), Thibs could rely on multiple All-Stars capable of producing their own shots in the half court, including Rose, Jimmy Butler, and Luol Deng, as well as a gifted passing center in his prime, Joakim Noah. The Knicks simply do not have the offensive talent of either of those rosters, reflected in their bottom-10 offensive rating this year. What they do have is youth, and players with the athletic ability to run the floor and play with pace.
But playing with more pace does not happen overnight — rather, it requires true commitment to running transition lanes, especially off turnovers and long rebounds, and the willingness to throw the ball ahead when such an opportunity arises. The Knicks in their current state have built awful habits in this regard, which must be broken if they want to see improvement in this area. Those habits are encapsulated here:
Somehow, despite the fact that three Miami Heat players are actually behind the ball when Randle steals it, the entire Miami defense catches up by the time Randle gets to half court. Randle, great as he has been this year, has a terrible tendency to walk the ball up the court after both rebounds and steals like this one. Also note how Payton spots up at the 3-point line instead of running to the rim and potentially opening up a passing lane to RJ. Mitchell Robinson, who should be habitually sprinting to the rim to open up options, barely breaks into a jog. This is the type of opportunity that the Knicks cannot afford to pass up, especially against as good a half-court defense as Miami’s.
Here again, Payton displays an unwillingness to run the floor that might create shots for others. It remains unclear why Payton repeatedly runs to the 3-point line, where he presents no threat and attracts no attention. Here, if he runs directly to the rim, he might take a defender with him, which might spring RJ or Reggie Bullock. Or, he could set a flare screen for Bullock (a screen behind Bullock’s man to allow Bullock to fade to an open spot on the arc) to free him up for three. Instead, Payton pauses behind the arc, before half-heartedly cutting through the lane, another semi-transition opportunity already squandered.
Another opportunistic way the Knicks should hunt for easy transition buckets is by sealing smaller defenders under the rim early, an option that should be available to both Barrett and Randle, considering their strength and size. Watch as RJ smartly attempts such a seal against tiny Darius Garland.
However, to exploit this sort of mismatch, the other four players on the floor have to match RJ’s pace to occupy defenders, and Randle needs to be looking up the floor earlier. Because the rest of the team instead trots leisurely forward, the possession transforms into yet another laborious Randle post-up.
In very stark contrast, check out Obi Toppin, the one Knick desperate to get out in transition. Toppin routinely accelerates into a full sprint downcourt after the Knicks secure a defensive rebound. While he isn’t often rewarded with a pass, he knows that if he dives hard to the rim it will open up New York’s shooters for wide open triples.
Even Randle and RJ have shown flashes of just how dynamic they could be on the break if they would just pursue those opportunities:
Neither of these possessions requires anything more than the commitment to run harder and faster than the opponent. But it unlocks such easy, uncontested shots for the Knicks, and provides a welcome reprieve from the grinding work of trying to manufacture a decent shot in the half court each and every possession. If the Knicks simply commit to aggressively running lanes in transition — shooters to corners, bigs (and Elfrid) to the rim — they could start to tilt their struggling offense toward league average. Pair that with a top-10 defense, and these New York Knicks could finish above .500 this season. But let’s get moving.
